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COMMON OWNERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES: 
THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION 
AS AN ANTICOMPETITIVE MECHANISM 
DAVID I. WALKER 
ABSTRACT 
Mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors are a growing 
presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes 
in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer 
to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies rather than the value of 
individual companies in isolation, this new reality has led to a concern that 
companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership 
might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But 
what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? 
Some commentators argue that one of the most plausible mechanisms is 
executive pay design. The idea is that executive pay at companies in 
concentrated industries with high common ownership may be designed to 
dampen the incentives of the companies’ managers to compete aggressively with 
peer firms. 
This Article challenges both the theoretical and empirical bases for this 
argument and contends that executive pay design is actually an implausible 
mechanism for linking common ownership with reduced competition. For 
example, this Article shows that, contrary to the claims of some commentators, 
the use of competition-enhancing executive relative performance evaluation as 
a compensation tool has increased dramatically in parallel with the increase in 
common ownership, exactly the opposite of what one would expect if common 
owners sought to dampen competition through pay design. 
Despite voicing skepticism regarding a possible association between common 
ownership and executive pay design, this Article also offers suggestions for 
improving empirical analyses going forward that should help to resolve the 
debate. If, however, as this Article argues, executive pay design is an implausible 
mechanism, this determination tends to undermine the broader claim that 
common ownership dampens interfirm competition. 
 
 Professor of Law and Maurice Poch Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School 
of Law. For their helpful comments and contributions, I am grateful to Jared Elias, Scott Hirst, 
Marcel Kahan, Yutian Luo, Rory Van Loo, and participants in a workshop at U.C. Hastings 
College of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An important emerging literature investigates the relationship between 
increasing institutional investor ownership of multiple companies within an 
industry and competition between these companies. Institutional investor 
ownership of U.S. equity securities has skyrocketed over the last several 
decades. These investors are currently estimated to hold 70-80% of the shares of 
the S&P 500.1 Unsurprisingly, institutional common ownership of companies 
within various industries has risen steeply as well. Between 1980 and 2010, the 
fraction of U.S. public companies with a 5% institutional shareholder holding of 
at least 5% of a competitor company increased from 10% to 60%.2 Neither trend 
shows signs of abating.  
The theoretical implications for competition are simple: unlike an investor in 
a single company, an investor who owns large stakes in competing companies 
A, B, and C has an interest in the profitability of the three companies in the 
aggregate and may not benefit from intense competition between the three 
companies, which could drive down aggregate returns. If the managers of A, B, 
and C respond to these common-owner preferences, they will compete less 
aggressively. Two recent papers provide evidence of such anticompetitive 
effects in the airline and banking industries,3 but the results of these papers and 
the broader issues are hotly contested.4 
A key question in this debate is: What mechanism would translate the 
anticompetitive preferences of common owners into competition-reducing 
actions by the managers of the commonly held companies? To a significant 
degree, the persuasiveness of the anticompetitive narrative depends on the 
identification of a plausible mechanism. 
For many commentators, executive pay design is a leading candidate. The 
idea is that executive pay arrangements at companies in industries with high 
 
1 See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2016) 
(citing Neil Stewart, Retail Shareholders: Looking Out for the Little Guy, IR MAG. (May 15, 
2012), https://www.irmagazine.com/shareholder-targeting-id/retail-shareholders-looking-
out-little-guy [https://perma.cc/YD5Y-RS4E]); Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, 
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4 (Aug. 21, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=21 
47757 [https://perma.cc/FNS2-85MM] (finding that institutions held 67% of value of all U.S. 
shares in 2010). 
2 See Jie (Jack) He & Jiekun Huang, Product Market Competition in a World of Cross-
Ownership: Evidence from Institutional Blockholdings, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2674, 2675 
(2017). 
3 See generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of 
Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) (airline industry); José Azar, Sahil Raina & 
Martin C. Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (May 4, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710252 [https://perma.cc 
/WU9E-9HP8] (banking sector). 
4 See infra Part I. 
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levels of common ownership may be designed to dampen managerial incentives 
to compete aggressively with peer firms.5 Empirical papers investigating this 
possibility have taken two approaches.  
First, a number of papers have investigated whether common ownership is 
associated with the use of executive relative performance evaluation (“RPE”).6 
As the term suggests, RPE-based compensation rewards executives for company 
performance relative to that of peer firms.7 Since a manager with a strong RPE-
based contract can profit by increasing own-firm performance or depressing 
peer-firm performance, RPE-based arrangements tend to encourage aggressive 
competition between companies and therefore would not be preferred—so the 
thinking goes—by investors with large common ownership stakes. In a highly 
cited working paper, Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné, and Martin C. 
Schmalz (“AEGS”) reported evidence of a negative association between 
common ownership and the use of RPE,8 but others have found evidence of a 
positive association9 or of no association.10 
Second, recognizing that managerial incentives are a function of equity 
holdings as well as current compensation arrangements, AEGS have revised 
their working paper, replacing RPE measures as their dependent variables with 
various measures of the sensitivity of an executive’s wealth to own-firm 
performance.11 They predict and find that greater common ownership is 
 
5 See respectively Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top 
Management Incentives 1 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 2046, 2016), 
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2046.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VMB-
MYC9] [hereinafter AEGS (2016)]; Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition, 
and Top Management Incentives 1 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Fin., Working Paper No. 
511/2017, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332 [https:// 
perma.cc/YU74-AMMG] [hereinafter AEGS (2018)]; Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, 
at 1556-57; Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 3, at 5. 
6 See, e.g., AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 2-3 (describing their model calculating RPE); 
Rebecca DeSimone, Stealth Socialism? Common Ownership and Executive Incentives 2 (Oct. 
7, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Heung Jin Kwon, Executive 
Compensation Under Common Ownership 1 (Nov. 29, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://fmaconferences.org/Boston/ExecutiveCompensationunderCommonOwnership.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ES7W-FF7G]; Lantian (Max) Liang, Common Ownership and Executive 
Compensation 1 (Oct. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://acfr.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets 
/pdf_file/0008/58085/43082-L-Liang-Common_ownership_V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU9E-
UU5Z]. 
7 See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 334-39 (1982) 
(showing that RPE-based contracts can improve risk sharing). 
8 AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 54 (finding negative association between common 
ownership and use of RPE); see also Liang, supra note 6, at 5 (same). 
9 See Kwon, supra note 6, at 17. 
10 See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 13. 
11 See generally AEGS (2018), supra note 5. 
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associated with lower wealth-to-performance sensitivity, that is, with lower-
powered, or “flatter” incentives that would, they suggest, result in less 
competition with peer firms.12 
This Article argues that executive pay design is actually not a plausible 
mechanism linking common ownership with reduced competition. It argues that 
executive pay design is a poor fit from a theoretical or conceptual standpoint, 
that the trends in executive pay over the last twenty years are inconsistent with 
this narrative, and that the empirical methods used to establish the purported 
relationship are flawed in ways that have not been identified by previous 
commentators. The analysis proceeds in four main parts. 
Part I briefly recaps the evidence and debate concerning the growth of 
institutional investor common ownership and the resulting impact on 
competition between commonly held companies. This Part also highlights the 
key question of the mechanism linking the two and the importance of executive 
pay design as a leading mechanism. 
Part II considers the possible relationship between common ownership and 
the use of RPE. This Part shows that the macro trends run exactly counter to the 
idea of executive pay serving as a mechanism for discouraging competition in 
industries with high levels of common ownership. If common owners discourage 
the use of RPE, one would expect reduced use of RPE over the last several 
decades as common ownership has mushroomed, but just the opposite is true. 
Prior to 2000, there was very little use of RPE in long-term executive pay 
arrangements at U.S. public companies. In the last two decades, use of explicit 
RPE has increased dramatically. Part II also offers other reasons to doubt that 
the use of RPE is a function of common ownership; for example, specific design 
elements of RPE are inconsistent with purported common-owner preferences. 
Finally, Part II identifies a serious flaw in the identification of RPE utilized in 
the empirical studies that find a negative relationship between common 
ownership and use of RPE. In short, the methodology is appropriate for 
identifying executive incentives associated with implicit RPE, but not 
appropriate for identifying executive incentives associated with explicit RPE, 
which now likely dominates.13 
Part III turns to the idea that the sensitivity of managerial wealth to own-firm 
performance (“WPS”) may be a function of common ownership and considers 
the evidence, focusing on three primary critiques. First, the use of lower-
powered incentives to discourage competition seems an unrealistically rough 
lever. Lower-powered incentives would not only discourage aggressive 
competition, but they would also discourage noncompetitive efforts to increase 
profits, such as through industry lobbying. This is both counterintuitive and at 
least facially inconsistent with the publicly stated positions of large institutional 
 
12 Id. at 2-4. 
13 As described infra Section II.A, explicit RPE metrics are directly incorporated into 
compensation instruments. Implicit RPE arises when discretionary elements of compensation 
are adjusted to reflect relative performance. 
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investors. Second, while compensation committees can easily adjust the level of 
RPE in current compensation contracts, their ability to manage WPS over the 
short to medium term is much more attenuated. Thus, evidence based on short-
term differences in WPS seems particularly difficult to square with the theory. 
Third, it is very difficult to determine WPS associated with the complex 
performance share awards that have come to dominate executive pay 
arrangements in recent years, and it is unclear whether or how empiricists have 
dealt with this problem.  
For the reasons discussed in Parts II and III, this Article concludes that 
executive pay design is an implausible mechanism for linking common 
ownership to anticompetitive behavior. From an empirical perspective, however, 
one can only say that such an association has not been convincingly 
demonstrated. In the spirit of helping to resolve the question, Part IV offers 
several suggestions for improving future empirical work on the possible 
association. This Part argues that a focus on RPE is more promising than a focus 
on WPS, although WPS should certainly serve as a control; that a convincing 
empirical strategy must include both implicit and explicit RPE; and that specific 
design features of explicit RPE-based compensation should be incorporated in 
future analyses.  
This Article concludes by emphasizing the importance of the mechanism 
question to the broader debate. Commentators relying on executive pay design 
as the mechanism linking common ownership to anticompetitive behavior would 
be advised to consider other mechanisms. In the meantime, one should be 
cautious in advocating regulatory intervention with respect to common 
ownership practices. 
I. THE COMMON OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION DEBATE 
This Part briefly surveys the growth in institutional common ownership of 
U.S. companies, the purported implications for product market competition, and 
the evidence. It highlights the debate between commentators who favor 
regulatory intervention and those who urge caution. Finally, it homes in on the 
key question of the mechanism linking common ownership to anticompetitive 
behavior and the prominence of executive pay design as a leading mechanism. 
As noted in the Introduction, institutional investor ownership of U.S. equities 
has increased dramatically in recent years. This has led to an equally dramatic 
increase in the number of cases in which common owners hold large positions 
in multiple companies within an industry. Much of the growth in institutional 
equity ownership and common ownership is attributable to positions held by 
stock market index funds, the most rapidly growing segment of the institutional 
investor market.14 The modus operandi of index funds, of course, is to own all 
 
14 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate 
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2019) 
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of the companies that the index tracks—that is, all of the companies included in 
the S&P 500, the Russell 3000, or whatever index is selected.15 As a result, index 
fund families’ common ownership of the leading companies in most industries 
is essentially inevitable. According to a recent study, the holdings of the “Big 
Three” index fund families—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard—taken 
together would represent the largest shareholder of 438 of the S&P 500 
companies.16  
Recent papers by José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu and by Azar, 
Sahil Raina, and Schmalz sparked concern about the possible anticompetitive 
aspects of increasing common ownership.17 As Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu 
explain: 
[W]ithin-industry diversification of influential shareholders can lead to less 
competition in portfolio firms’ product markets. To see why, imagine an 
industry with two equal-sized firms, A and B. Suppose A undercuts B’s 
price to attract customers from B and thus gain market share. Depending 
on the parameters, firm A may benefit from such a move by selling many 
more units of a product at an only slightly reduced price. Variations of this 
logic are the basis for many standard models of competition. 
However, A’s gain in market share comes at the expense of firm B’s 
market share, and average prices in the market are lower. As a result, the 
owner of firm B loses more revenue than the owner of firm A gains and 
thus the sum of A’s and B’s producer rents falls. This means that an investor 
holding equal-sized stakes in both A and B would enjoy greater total (i.e., 
portfolio) profits if the two firms set prices or quantities as if they were two 
divisions of a monopoly instead of as two independent firms. We therefore 
expect less competition compared to the standard model, to the extent that 
shareholders are diversified across natural competitors and portfolio firms 
act in their diversified shareholders’ interest.18 
In their empirical analyses, these authors find associations between 
institutional investor common ownership and reduced competition between 
companies in the airline and banking industries.19 Specifically, Azar, Schmalz, 
and Tecu find that taking common ownership into account results in market 
 
(manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282794 [https:// 
perma.cc/53S7-N2PS] (noting dramatic increase in assets held by index funds). 
15 Id. (manuscript at 11-12). 
16 Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big 
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial 
Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017). 
17 See Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1558; Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 
3, at 15. 
18 Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1521. The companies whose shares are held by 
institutional investors are referred to as “portfolio” companies. 
19 Id. at 1513 (airlines); Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 3, at 5 (banking). 
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concentration within the U.S. airline industry that is ten times larger than the 
level presumed to be likely to enhance market power per Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice guidelines.20 And they produce evidence 
of a positive association between ticket prices and the degree of common 
ownership of airlines serving various routes.21 Azar, Raina, and Schmalz 
examine the impact of common ownership and cross-ownership of U.S. banks 
and find that, taking these ownership features into account, regional industry 
concentration is correlated with bank fees and deposit thresholds.22 
These papers have been highly influential, but also controversial. Several 
researchers have questioned the strength of the empirical evidence and/or the 
theoretical underpinnings. For example, Daniel O’Brien and Keith Waehrer 
argue that the regressions in these papers are misspecified in such a way as to 
lead to a correlation between common ownership and product prices even if 
there is no causal connection.23 More generally, they question the use of the 
modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“MHHI”) as the measure of common 
ownership in these papers, arguing that the MHHI “does not provide a reliable 
prediction of the effects of common ownership” on product prices in 
oligopolistic markets.24 Edward Rock and Daniel Rubinfeld argue that managers 
 
20 Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1526. 
21 See id. at 1559 (“[W]e find that airline ticket prices are 3% to 7% higher due to common 
ownership . . . .”). 
22 See Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 3, at 3. While common ownership refers to an 
investor holding shares in competing companies, cross-ownership refers to one company in 
an industry holding shares in a competitor. See id. at 2. 
23 See Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common 
Ownership: We Know Less than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 732 (2017). 
24 Id. at 744; see also Erik P. Gilje, Todd A. Gormley & Doron Levit, Who’s Paying 
Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives, J. FIN. 
ECON. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165574 [https://perma.cc/3H5M-4AH7] (arguing that MHHI 
measure unrealistically assumes that all investors are fully attentive); Jacob Gramlich & 
Serafin Grundl, Testing for Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd. 
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-029, 2017), https://www.federal 
reserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017029pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5AZ-3EC5] (criticizing 
use of MHHI and proposing alternative). The MHHI is a generalization of the HHI, which 
has long been used in antitrust analysis as a measure of industry concentration. Modifications 
introduced by Timothy Bresnahan and Steven Salop and by Daniel O’Brien and Salop take 
into account partial ownership and common ownership. See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Steven 
C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 155, 155 (1986) (“We focus on the impact of the financial interest and management 
control strucutre of the venture.”); Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects 
of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 
561-62 (2000); see also Menesh S. Patel, Common Ownership, Institutional Investors, and 
Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 279, 325-28 (2018) (arguing that whether common ownership 
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are unlikely to take investor common ownership incentives into account given 
the conflicting and constantly changing positions of their institutional 
shareholders, including interests in suppliers and customers of these 
companies.25  
Despite the theoretical and empirical challenges to the banking and airline 
papers, a number of legal scholars have concluded that the evidence is 
sufficiently clear to warrant regulatory action addressing the adverse effects of 
common ownership on competition. Concluding that the “evidence now firmly 
establish[es] that high levels of horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets 
often has anticompetitive effects,” Einer Elhauge argues that existing U.S. and 
E.U. antitrust regulation should be brought to bear.26 Eric Posner, Fiona Scott 
Morton, and Glen Weyl propose limiting investors’ aggregate holdings in 
oligopolistic industries to 1% of the industry unless investors elect to hold only 
a single company within such an industry.27  
Other commentators urge caution. Scott Hemphill and Marcel Kahan note that 
while placing limitations on common ownership might be viewed as a “better 
safe than sorry” strategy from an antitrust perspective, discouraging common 
owners from participating in corporate governance could be costly.28 Given their 
misgivings regarding the evidence and finding the Posner, Scott Morton, and 
Weyl proposal unduly severe, Rock and Rubinfeld suggest the creation of an 
antitrust safe harbor for institutional investors who limit ownership to 15% of a 
given company’s equity, do not have board representation, and engage in only 
“normal” corporate governance activities.29 Obviously, the legal and regulatory 
stakes here are very high.30 
 
will actually generate competitive harm in a particular industry depends on a number of 
factors and requires case-by-case analysis). 
25 See Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 
ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 230-39 (2018). 
26 Einer R. Elhauge, New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal 
Shareholding 40 (Jan. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096812 
[https://perma.cc/T87Y-7S6P] (suggesting that U.S.’s Sherman and Clayton Acts and E.U.’s 
TFEU Article 101 can help regulate anticompetitive horizontal shareholding); see also Fiona 
Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 
YALE L.J. 2026, 2047 (2018) (concluding that “Section 7 of the Clayton Act presents a 
promising vehicle for combatting the anticompetitive effects of horizontal shareholding”). 
27 See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the 
Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (2017). 
28 C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common 
Ownership, YALE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 52-53), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3210373## [https://perma.cc/W7UR-LKUT]. 
29 See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 25, at 270-77. 
30 To gain a sense of the importance of these questions and this debate, note that the Azar, 
Schmalz, and Tecu airline industry paper—which was only recently published in the Journal 
of Finance, supra note 3—has been downloaded on SSRN over 12,500 times as of November 
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An important question in this debate concerns the mechanism linking the 
portfolio-maximizing incentives of institutional investors and the 
anticompetitive actions of the managers of particular companies. How would the 
managers of these companies be induced to refrain from vigorous competition 
with peer firms? Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu suggest a number of potential 
mechanisms: common owners may influence portfolio company management 
by engaging with them directly, by creating managerial incentive structures that 
discourage competition, by electing directors sympathetic to avoiding vigorous 
competition, or by doing nothing.31 The final idea is that competing with peer 
firms is personally costly for managers. If common owners fail to push managers 
to compete, they will tend to refrain from competing and simply enjoy the “quiet 
life.”32  
Hemphill and Kahan provide numerous reasons to question these and other 
proposed mechanisms linking common ownership with reduced competition.33 
They point out that several mechanisms have not been empirically tested and 
that others are implausible.34 They are skeptical that common owners would 
prefer the adoption of weak managerial incentives as a means of discouraging 
competition, but conclude that avoiding the use of relative performance 
evaluation at firms in industries with a high degree of common ownership is 
more plausible.35 They also conclude that “selective omission,” or passivity, of 
common owners in cases in which firm value and portfolio value conflict is 
another plausible mechanism.36 
In a series of draft papers, AEGS show as a theoretical matter that common 
owners could discourage interfirm competition by “failing to offer managerial 
compensation that is as performance-sensitive as the compensation provided by 
 
2019. See José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common 
Ownership, SSRN (Apr. 22, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2427345 [https://perma.cc/U54U-WND5] (indicating 12,598 downloads as of November 29, 
2019). 
31 See Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1552-58. 
32 Id. at 1552-53. 
33 See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 47-49). Hemphill and Kahan also 
note the lack of strong incentives on the part of institutional common owners to undertake 
costly or risky actions to increase portfolio values. Id. (manuscript at 40). Index-focused 
investors, in particular, have traditionally been viewed as passive. See id. (manuscript at 45). 
Their economic incentives are to provide investment opportunities that accurately track 
indexes at the lowest possible cost. Id. (manuscript at 44-46). As such, some commentators 
conclude that these funds are unlikely to invest resources in attempting to shape corporate 
policy or governance. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 14 (manuscript at 79) 
(concluding that “index fund managers have inadequate incentives to engage in stewardship 
aimed at enhancing the value of particular companies”). 
34 Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 6-8). 
35 Id. (manuscript at 21-22). 
36 Id. (manuscript at 30-31). 
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undiversified owners.”37 They provide empirical evidence indicating that, as 
predicted by their theory, companies with a high degree of common ownership 
tend to make less use of relative performance evaluation38 and tend to adopt less 
high-powered incentives generally.39 Because establishing a plausible 
mechanism linking common ownership to reduced competition is a critical step 
in the broader debate, it is important to review these claims carefully, and that is 
the purpose of the remainder of this Article.  
II. RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMMON OWNERSHIP 
This Part considers the theory and evidence linking executive RPE to 
common ownership and interfirm competition. It begins by recapping the 
theoretical connections. Next, it briefly traces the evolution of executive pay 
design over the last thirty years, roughly the period during which common 
ownership has become prevalent. The key takeaway is that explicit use of RPE 
has increased dramatically in tandem with the growth in common ownership—
exactly the opposite of what one would predict if reduced use of RPE were a 
mechanism for translating the anticompetitive preferences of common owners 
into reduced competition. Finally, this Part addresses the empirical literature 
connecting RPE with common ownership and argues that the evidence of a 
negative association supporting the compensation mechanism hypothesis is 
unpersuasive. This Part points out a critical shortcoming in the literature: a focus 
on an empirical strategy that properly identifies implicit use of RPE but not the 
explicit use of RPE, which likely now dominates. 
A. A Primer on RPE 
Nobel economics laureate Bengt Holmstrom demonstrated in the 1980s that 
executive compensation arrangements could be made more efficient by 
employing relative performance measures that would filter out the noise of 
industry or market movements over which executives have no control.40 Instead 
of basing a bonus solely on a company’s total shareholder return, for instance, 
the bonus could be based on the company’s total return relative to the total return 
of a select group of peer companies or of a broad group of companies. RPE 
metrics both filter out uncontrollable risks (seemingly attractive to executives) 
and reduce compensation windfalls associated with general market rises 
(seemingly attractive to investors).  
RPE-based compensation can either be explicit or implicit. The relative total 
shareholder return-based bonus described in the preceding paragraph is an 
example of explicit RPE. Relative performance is built into the bonus targets. In 
other cases, however, a company’s board might use its discretion to adjust salary 
 
37 AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 2. 
38 See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 28. 
39 See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 3-4. 
40 Holmstrom, supra note 7, at 334-38. 
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levels or bonus payouts based in part on the firm’s performance relative to other 
companies along any number of metrics. This would be an example of implicit 
RPE. All else equal, the introduction of RPE, whether explicit or implicit, but 
anticipated, encourages competition with peer firms, since managers can 
enhance relative performance by improving own-firm performance or by taking 
actions that reduce peer-firm performance.  
Of course, all else is not always equal. The selection of the peer group is 
critical to the creation of competitive incentives. Consider, for example, two 
RPE-based bonus schemes. One is based on shareholder return relative to a 
dozen close competitors. The other is based on shareholder return relative to all 
of the members of the Russell 3000 index (which includes the dozen peer firms). 
In each case, the bonus is a function of the company’s rank among the 
benchmarked companies. The first design most pointedly encourages 
competition with peer companies, since undermining the performance of one or 
more of these dozen firms would materially improve the company’s rank among 
the thirteen and thus an executive’s bonus. On the other hand, depressing the 
performance of one or more peer firms is unlikely to materially affect the 
company’s shareholder return ranking among the Russell 3000 companies, and 
thus the latter design is less likely to affect competition between rival firms. 
The nature of RPE-based metrics is also important. Schmalz argues that RPE 
metrics reflecting company value creation, such as total shareholder return, 
encourage product market competition with peer firms, while margin-based 
metrics actually discourage such competition.41 For example, a company might 
increase its relative profits and returns by increasing output and market share, 
but in order to maximize margins relative to its peers, a company would tend to 
restrict its output.42 All else equal, common owners would prefer that their 
portfolio companies restrict output and push up prices. So it is feasible that 
companies might embrace RPE while selecting metrics that do not encourage 
fierce product market competition between commonly owned peer firms.  
B. The Use of RPE in Executive Pay Contracts 
Prior to the mid-2000s, RPE played a relatively insignificant role in U.S. 
public company executive pay arrangements.43 This situation changed 
dramatically in the mid- to late-2000s and 2010s as performance awards, often 
including explicit RPE metrics, supplanted stock options as the dominant equity 
 
41 See Martin Schmalz, Presentation at FTC Hearing #8 on Competition and Consumer 
Protection in the 21st Century: Competitive Harm from Common Ownership: Common 
Ownership Theories, Governance “Mechanisms” & Policy 63 (Dec. 6, 2018). 
42 See id. 
43 See David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: Understanding and Evaluating 
Performance-Based Executive Pay, 1 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 395, 399 (2016) (“Conventional stock 
options, and to a lesser extent restricted stock, reigned supreme during the early years of the 
equity pay era.”). 
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pay instrument.44 RPE is undoubtedly a larger feature of executive pay design 
today than ever before. This Section briefly describes these executive pay trends 
and their implications for both implicit and explicit RPE.  
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed explosive growth in U.S. public company 
executive pay45 and a transformative shift away from an emphasis on salary and 
short-term, accounting-based incentives in favor of longer-term, equity-based 
pay.46 In part, this transformation was a response to criticism from economists, 
such as Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, who chided companies for providing 
insufficient performance-based incentives and paying executives like 
“bureaucrats.”47 However, tax and accounting rules played major roles as well.48 
The new equity-based compensation consisted primarily of stock options that 
rewarded executives for increases in their companies’ share prices and, to a 
lesser extent, time-vested restricted stock grants that provided shares to 
executives who remained with their companies for the typical three- or four-year 
vesting period.49 By 2000, 70% of senior executive pay at 350 large U.S. 
 
44 See id. at 405-08 (detailing rise of RPE compensation in 2000s). 
45 The average compensation of the CEOs of large U.S. public companies increased in real 
terms (adjusting for inflation) by 500% or more between 1975 and 2000. See Xavier Gabaix 
& Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49, 51 (2008); 
see also Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a 
Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2107 (2010). 
46 Frydman & Saks, supra note 45, at 2107. 
47 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO 
Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 
138. 
48 Prior to 2006, U.S. financial accounting rules strongly favored the use of the 
conventional, at-the-money stock options that are described in the following note over other 
forms of pay. Unlike all other forms of pay, companies were not required to recognize on their 
financial statements any compensation expense for these options at any time. See David I. 
Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232, 238 (Claire A. Hill & 
Brett M. McDonnell eds., 2012). In addition, a tax rule enacted in 1993, I.R.C. § 162(m), 
limited corporate tax deductions for senior executive pay to $1 million per executive per year 
but made an exception for performance-based pay, which included these stock options. See 
id. at 239. It is generally believed that § 162(m) contributed to the dramatic increase in the 
use of stock options and other forms of performance-based executive pay in the 1990s. See 
Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 877, 906 (2007) (“The enactment of § 162(m) provides an excuse for the 
colluding parties to engage in significant restructuring of compensation arrangements all in 
the name of preserving corporate deductions.”). 
49 Stock options provide the holder with a right, but no obligation, to purchase shares at a 
predetermined exercise price. Conventional compensatory stock options have a fixed exercise 
price set equal to the market price of the company’s shares on the date of the grant (known as 
an at-the-money option); vest and become exercisable over some period, typically three to 
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companies consisted of a combination of restricted stock and options, and most 
of that compensation took the form of options.50 
While short-term bonuses were sometimes based on accounting performance 
vis-à-vis that of peers and so included explicit RPE, this was rarely the case for 
restricted stock grants and almost never the case for stock options.51 This was 
not ideal. It was widely recognized that purely time-vested restricted stock and 
conventional stock options rewarded executives for market rises even if firm-
specific performance lagged the market and also exposed executives to market 
risk over which they had no control. In other words, these pay instruments lacked 
RPE. Holmstrom and other theorists had explained that the efficiency of pay 
could be improved by factoring out market risk and focusing rewards more 
closely on own-firm performance,52 and practice-oriented commentators 
proposed a means for doing so: indexing the exercise price of options to the 
market or to a basket of stocks including peer firms.53 But for a variety of tax 
and accounting reasons, indexation of options did not happen.54 So by the year 
 
five years following grant; are nontransferable; and expire after ten years. Walker, supra note 
48, at 237. Time-vested restricted stock is typically awarded to an executive at no explicit 
cost. Id. If the executive remains with her company through the vesting period, the stock 
becomes owned outright. If the executive leaves prior to vesting, the stock must be returned. 
The stock may not be transferred or hypothecated in the interim. Id. Restricted stock units 
(“RSUs”) are economically identical but represent a promise to deliver stock on the vesting 
date rather than an actual delivery of contingently owned stock. Id. Vesting details vary but 
typically involve ratable vesting over a period of three to five years following grant. Id. I use 
the term “restricted stock” in this Article to refer both to conventional restricted stock and 
RSUs. 
50 See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of 
Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 633 (2011). 
51 Level 3 Communications was one exception. In the 1990s, Level 3 adopted a stock-
option plan that indexed option-exercise prices to variations in the S&P 500. See Joann S. 
Lublin, Pay for Outperforming: James Crowe, Chief of Level 3 Communications, Makes the 
Case for Linking Stock Options to Market-Beating Gains, WALL STREET J., Apr. 6, 2000, at 
R8. 
52 See Holmstrom, supra note 7, at 334-39. 
53 See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 91, 93-97. 
54 Prior to 2006, U.S. financial accounting rules strongly favored the use of conventional, 
at-the-money stock options over other forms of pay. Companies were not required to 
recognize any compensation expense for these options at any time. Indexed options, by 
contrast, had to be expensed, and the expense had to be adjusted in each accounting period 
for fluctuations in share price. See Walker, supra note 48, at 238. Although the accounting 
rules for equity-based pay were rationalized beginning in 2006, § 409A of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which was enacted in 2004, essentially precludes the issuance of indexed 
options today by imposing a 20% penalty tax on the income arising from such options. See 
id. at 239-40. 
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2000, only a small fraction of U.S. public company executive pay included any 
explicit RPE.55 
To be sure, relative performance evaluation could have factored into 
executive pay contracts implicitly. Increases in salary, bonus targets, and equity 
grants might have been based, in part, on the prior year’s (or years’) performance 
relative to peer firms. However, the evidence of implicit RPE in executive pay 
contracts during this period is modest. For example, Rick Antle and Abbie Smith 
examined executive pay at thirty-nine companies within three industries 
between 1947 and 1977 and found only weak evidence of implicit RPE.56 Robert 
Gibbons and Kevin Murphy analyzed CEO pay at over 1000 companies between 
1974 and 1986 and found evidence that RPE was used implicitly in 
compensation and retention decisions; however, they also found that 
performance was more likely to be gauged relative to broad market movements 
than to industry-specific performance.57 Writing in 2003, John Core, Wayne 
Guay, and David Larcker concluded that there was little evidence that executive 
bonuses included RPE.58 
This situation changed dramatically in the early 2000s as performance awards 
replaced stock options as the single largest element of most senior executive pay 
packages.59 Performance awards include performance-based option plans and 
long-term cash incentive plans that are performance based, but most 
performance awards consist of performance shares.60 Performance shares are 
essentially restricted stock grants that vest based on achievement of time and 
performance hurdles. Typically, performance share plans cover three-year 
performance periods and allow for the delivery of a variable number of shares 
associated with threshold, target, and maximum achievement of performance 
 
55 See Walker, supra note 43, at 405. 
56 See Rick Antle & Abbie Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance 
Evaluation of Corporate Executives, 24 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 3 (1986) (finding some evidence of 
RPE at sixteen of thirty-nine companies and describing their results as “mixed”). 
57 See Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief 
Executive Officers, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 30-S, 38-S (1990). As 
discussed supra Section II.A, benchmarking against broad market movements is less likely to 
encourage competition than benchmarking against a select group of peer companies. 
58 See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation 
and Incentives: A Survey, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL. REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 38. 
59 See Walker, supra note 43, at 405 (noting that performance-based equity pay increased 
by 350% between 2001 and 2012). 
60 See J. Carr Bettis et al., Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive Compensation, 
66 J. ACCT. & ECON. 194, 197 (2018) (analyzing compensation at 1000 large companies and 
finding that 97% of companies utilizing performance-based equity pay issued performance 
shares while only 8% issued performance-based options). To be clear, performance-based 
options are not options with indexed exercise prices but are options that vest on the 
achievement of performance thresholds as well as time. 
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goals.61 Beyond this, however, performance share design details vary widely. 
Plans may include absolute (firm-specific) performance goals, relative 
performance goals, or (increasingly) some combination of the two.62 The goals 
may be based on accounting results (e.g., earnings per share), market results 
(e.g., total shareholder return),63 or other more idiosyncratic metrics (e.g., safety 
performance).64 Where RPE is explicitly invoked, performance may be 
measured relative to a broad market index (e.g., the S&P 500), an industry-
specific index, or a select group of peer firms.65  
Performance awards now account for the majority of the long-term incentives 
provided to U.S. public-company senior executives. In an analysis of 2017 CEO 
compensation at the largest 300 U.S. public companies, executive pay 
consultants Korn Ferry found that performance awards accounted for 55% of 
long-term incentives at the median, with conventional options and time-vested 
restricted stock each accounting for about 22.5%.66 
The explicit use of RPE has mushroomed as companies have embraced 
performance awards. Because performance awards can include multiple goals, 
it is difficult to pinpoint the exact economic significance of RPE in executive 
pay contracts, but the growth is unmistakable. Rebecca DeSimone finds that the 
fraction of companies in the ISS Incentive Lab database that included explicit 
RPE metrics in long-term compensation awards increased from less than 15% 
during the height of the late 1990s/early 2000s option boom to over 50% by 
 
61 See FW COOK, 2018 TOP 250 REPORT 17 (2018), https://www.fwcook.com/content 
/documents/Publications/11-7-18_FWC_2018_Top_250_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5DZ-
HPW4] (showing that 91% of surveyed companies reported measuring performance over a 
three-year period). Although most plans provide for threshold, target, and maximum 
performance targets, the number of shares delivered is generally a continuous function with 
interpolation between these discrete targets. See Walker, supra note 43, at 412. 
62 See Bettis et al., supra note 60, at 198. 
63 Total shareholder return is the sum of share price appreciation and dividends paid per 
share over some period, expressed as a percentage of share price at the beginning of the period. 
Total Shareholder Return (TSR), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t 
/tsr.asp [https://perma.cc/NC9W-2L8Y] (last updated June 25, 2019). 
64 See Bettis et al., supra note 60, at 200. 
65 See John Bizjak et al., The Role of Peer Firm Selection in Explicit Relative Performance 
Awards 15 (Apr. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833309 [https://perma.cc/8VE3-TRZZ]. 
66 Press Release, Tracy Kurschner, Pub. Relations Manager, Korn Ferry, Cash Is Not 
King—CEO Annual Pay Raises Hit New Low with Smallest Increase in 6 Years (May 4, 
2017), https://ir.kornferry.com/news-releases/news-release-details/cash-not-king-ceo-annual 
-pay-raises-hit-new-low-smallest [https://perma.cc/M8BB-VXS7]; see EQUILAR, EXECUTIVE 
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLANS: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE TRENDS 8 (2017) (finding that 87% of 
S&P 500 companies granted at least one performance award in 2015). 
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2014.67 Similarly, executive pay consultant Equilar reports that the percentage 
of S&P 500 companies issuing explicit RPE awards to their CEOs increased 
from 42% to 57% between 2011 and 2015 alone.68  
To be sure, some companies may adjust discretionary compensation based on 
relative performance in addition to or instead of incorporating RPE explicitly 
into equity pay instruments. But given the popularity of explicit RPE and the 
push from proxy advisory firms and institutional investors for RPE described in 
the next section, it seems likely that explicit RPE dominates implicit RPE in 
today’s executive pay landscape. 
C. Why Did Companies Embrace Explicit RPE in the 2000s? 
This Article is primarily concerned with the current widespread adoption of 
RPE and its relationship with common ownership. Thus, to some extent, the 
reason that companies adopted explicit RPE-based awards is irrelevant. 
Nonetheless, a brief look at why companies embraced RPE may help us 
understand the contours and likely persistence of today’s common pay practices.  
While certainly not perfectly clear, the largest factor in the widespread 
adoption of explicit RPE metrics in long-term executive pay arrangements was 
likely the move away from stock options in the early 2000s.69 Encouraged by 
tax and accounting preferences, U.S. public companies embraced stock options 
as the primary long-term incentive pay vehicle in the 1990s.70 In theory, stock 
options could have been designed to include RPE. The exercise price of options 
could have been indexed to a measure of industry or market performance, such 
that payouts would be based on firm-specific performance, but tax and 
accounting rules effectively prevented companies from adopting indexed 
options.71  
However, reliance on options declined precipitously in the 2000s with the 
burst of the dot-com bubble and the end to irrational exuberance and with the 
2004 (effective 2006) revision of U.S. accounting rules to level the playing field 
between options and other forms of compensation.72 In addition, stock options 
 
67 See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 34. The ISS Incentive Lab database provides detailed 
information on executive pay arrangements since 1998 at approximately 1200 of the largest 
U.S. public companies. Id. at 15. 
68 EQUILAR, supra note 66, at 8. 
69 Walker, supra note 50, at 634-41 (discussing various factors influencing shift from 
option to stock compensation). 
70 As discussed supra note 48, prior to 2006, conventional compensatory stock options 
bore no cost from an accounting perspective. Further, in 1992 Congress amended the tax rules 
to deny deductions for senior executive pay in excess of $1 million per executive per year 
except for certain performance-based pay. Stock options satisfied the performance-pay 
exception. Walker, supra note 48, at 239. 
71 See supra note 54. 
72 See Walker, supra note 50, at 636, 639-41. 
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took on a negative connotation in the wake of options-related scandals at Enron, 
WorldCom, and Tyco in the early 2000s and with the option backdating scandal 
that followed a few years later.73 With options out of favor, companies turned to 
other equity-based tools, including restricted stock, to provide medium- to long-
term incentives. But restricted stock had its own credibility problem. By this 
point, shareholder advocates and proxy advisory firms had thoroughly embraced 
the position that executive pay should be linked closely with firm performance, 
and conventional, time-vested restricted stock—sometimes derisively referred 
to as “pay for pulse”—was not viewed as being sufficiently performance-based 
for many stakeholders.74 However, performance-vesting conditions could be 
added to restricted stock without triggering any adverse tax or accounting 
consequences, and, of course, this is what companies did, increasingly, 
beginning in the 2000s.75 
To be sure, there was no inherent requirement that performance conditions 
placed on restricted stock be relative performance conditions. The adoption of 
absolute performance conditions may have been sufficient for many 
stakeholders. But once performance conditions were dictated and the accounting 
and tax obstacles to the adoption of RPE were eliminated, it is perhaps not 
surprising that many companies would embrace RPE as consistent with 
compensation theory and common sense. 
An additional push for RPE came from two sources. First, the large 
institutional investors (who are also the largest common owners and might be 
expected to disfavor RPE if compensation is a mechanism for dampening 
competition) at least superficially promoted relative evaluation.76 Second, the 
 
73 See id. at 637-38. 
74 See, e.g., Simon Patterson & David Bixby, Can RSUs Reduce Executive Pay 
Complexity?, PEARL MEYER (Dec. 2017), https://www.pearlmeyer.com/knowledge-share 
/ask-the-expert/can-rsus-reduce-executive-pay-complexity [https://perma.cc/L8SU-4ZPH] 
(noting investors’ perception that time-vested restricted stock constitutes “paying for pulse”). 
75 In addition, purely time-vested restricted stock did not satisfy the performance-based 
pay exception to I.R.C. § 162(m) and thus was largely not deductible. Restricted stock with 
performance-vesting conditions was generally fully deductible. See Walker, supra note 43, at 
407. 
76 BlackRock, for example, states that “[o]ur evaluation of equity compensation plans is 
based on a company’s executive pay and performance relative to peers.” BLACKROCK, PROXY 
VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES 11 (2019), https://www.blackrock.com 
/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WGL-2AV2]. In determining how to vote on executive “say on pay” 
proposals, Fidelity takes into account “[t]he alignment of executive compensation and 
company performance relative to peers.” FIDELITY, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 6 (2019), 
https://www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/Full-Proxy-
Voting-Guidelines-for-Fidelity-Funds-Advised-by-FMRCo-and-SelectCo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BE2N-RGYH]. Capital Group 
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proxy advisory firms adopted executive pay guidelines that encouraged the use 
of RPE. For example, in its discussion of its approach to executive compensation 
analysis, proxy advisor Glass Lewis states: “[W]e believe executive 
compensation should be closely tied not to absolute or overall performance but 
rather to the company’s track record of performance relative to its peers. 
Management should be especially rewarded for directing the company in a 
manner that outperforms its peers.”77 
Moreover, the proxy advisory firms have explicitly incorporated RPE in their 
evaluation processes. Glass Lewis’s proprietary pay-for-performance model is 
based on a comparison of executive compensation, total shareholder return, 
earnings-per-share growth, change in operating cash flow, return on equity, and 
return on assets at the target company and at a selected group of peer 
companies.78 
Similarly, the most influential proxy advisory firm, Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”), employs several tools for evaluating the relationship between 
executive pay and performance—three of which are based on relative 
performance.79 For example, their Relative Degree of Alignment measure 
determines a company’s percentile rank over a three-year period among a group 
of peer firms for CEO pay and total shareholder return and then compares the 
two percentiles.80 Executives are overpaid by this measure when their CEO pay 
percentile exceeds their total shareholder return percentile.81 According to John 
Bizjak, Swaminathan Kalpathy, Zhichuan Frank Li, and Brian Young, 
compensation consultants report that companies often adopt explicit RPE-based 
awards when ISS raises questions about the relationship between pay and 
company performance.82 
 
prefer[s] a significant portion of management’s compensation to come in the form of 
equity stakes tied to long-term value creation for all shareholders. It is important, 
however, that such compensation be designed not merely to reward a “rising tide” in 
either the market or a specific industry that cannot be fairly attributed to management 
skill or contribution. 
Information on Capital Group’s Policies and Disclosures, CAPITAL GROUP, 
https://www.capitalgroup.com/us/policies-and-disclosures.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 
77 Understanding Our Compensation Analysis, GLASS LEWIS, https://web.archive.org/web 
/20190226024258/http://www.glasslewis.com/understanding-our-compensation-analysis/ 
[https://perma.cc/N9H8-56P5] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (click “Pay-for-Performance 
Analysis”). 
78 See id. 
79 INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDERS SERVS., PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE MECHANICS 5-7 (2019), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/Pay-for-Performance-
Mechanics.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4W5-PFYE] (specifically, Relative Degree of Alignment, 
Multiples of Median, and Financial Performance Assessment). 
80 See id. at 5-6. 
81 See id. at 5. 
82 See Bizjak et al., supra note 65, at 23 n.24. 
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D. Avoidance of RPE Is Unlikely to Be a Mechanism by Which Common 
Owners Discourage Interfirm Competition 
It is well understood that the ownership of U.S. equities has become 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors in general and 
in the hands of index funds specifically.83 Given the objective of owning the 
market, it is not surprising that index investors have amassed large stakes in 
multiple companies within an industry. To be sure, the significance of this 
common ownership and even how it is best measured is controversial,84 but by 
any measure, the incidence and degree of common ownership has increased 
significantly over the last twenty-five years.85 
Undoubtedly less well recognized is the transformation of executive pay over 
the same period—chiefly the replacement of options at many companies with 
performance shares and the inclusion of explicit RPE metrics in many of these 
awards.86 In an influential article, Elhauge suggests that increasing institutional 
investor common ownership, which he calls horizontal shareholding, can help 
explain the shift toward compensation schemes—principally stock options—
that reward executives for industry or market performance rather than for firm-
specific performance alone.87 While this might have been an accurate 
description of the executive pay landscape in the year 2000, this line of argument 
ignores the dramatic increase in the use of explicit RPE metrics in executive pay 
arrangements over the last twenty years, as documented above.88 It is simply no 
longer true as an empirical matter. 
The upshot, however, is that the major secular trends in share ownership and 
executive pay design run exactly counter to the hypothesis that compensation 
design might serve as a mechanism linking common ownership to reduced 
interfirm competition. As displayed in Figure 1 below, both common ownership 
and the use of explicit RPE have increased substantially over the last twenty to 
twenty-five years—exactly opposite of what one would expect if common 










83 See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 23-25. 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
86 See Walker, supra note 43, at 396. 
87 See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1278-81. 
88 See supra text accompanying notes 59-68. 
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This macro-level evidence is also inconsistent with the hypothesized passive 
or “do nothing” mechanism proposed by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu.90 Recall that 
the idea here is that, unlike an undiversified owner who might actively 
encourage competition, a common owner might simply refrain from active 
encouragement, in which case executives will tend to avoid taking personally 
costly actions to compete and simply enjoy the quiet life.91 But adopting RPE-
based compensation instruments is the opposite of doing nothing. Given the 
potential to boost pay by outcompeting peer firms, it would be costly for RPE-
compensated executives to refrain from competition. 
Of course, this macro-level evidence is not conclusive. It is possible that while 
the use of RPE is increasing generally among U.S. companies, companies in 
 
89 Common ownership data is based on Liang, supra note 6, at 30, and represents the 
fraction of ExecuComp companies that share at least one common blockholder with another 
company in the same industry. Compustat’s ExecuComp database compiles senior executive 
pay data from proxy statements of approximately 2200 of the largest U.S. public companies 
each year. See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 10. RPE-use data is based on DeSimone, supra 
note 6, at 34, and represents the fraction of ISS Incentive Lab companies that issue at least 
one long-term performance award incorporating an RPE metric each year. 
90 Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1556-58. 
91 See id. 
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industries with high levels of common ownership avoid the use of RPE or design 
RPE in such a way as to minimize incentives to compete. But, as discussed in 
the following paragraphs, the evidence does not support these ideas either. 
Let us begin with the latter idea—that RPE might be designed in such a way 
as to create an appearance of performance measurement vis-à-vis peers (that 
might satisfy the proxy advisory firms and other stakeholders) but to actually 
avoid fostering intense competition.92 As noted above, choice of peer group is a 
key RPE design issue.93 RPE may be based on a select group of peer companies, 
on a preexisting industry-specific index, or on a broad market index.94 While the 
use of a select peer group benchmark creates incentives to undermine peer 
performance, this is not the case for RPE based on a broad market index. As 
discussed above, undermining the performance of one’s direct competitors—by 
taking market share or through other means—would have an insignificant effect 
on relative company performance if company performance is gauged relative to 
the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000 index.95 The impact of benchmarking against 
an industry-specific index would be somewhere in between, likely depending on 
the number of companies in the index.  
So one way of incorporating RPE without encouraging intense competition 
would be through selection of a broad market index as the “peer” group. Thus, 
to the extent that commonly owned companies utilize explicit RPE, the 
compensation-mechanism hypothesis would predict that these companies would 
adopt broad market indices as benchmarks. However, while all three approaches 
are observed in practice, the most common approach is to employ a select group 
of peer firms, typically ten to twenty companies.96 Bizjak, Kalpathy, Li, and 
Young find that of the 47% of ISS Incentive Lab companies that issued RPE-
based awards in 2015, 60% employed a select group of peer firms, while 22% 
employed a broad market index.97 The emphasis on select peer firm 
benchmarking does not seem consistent with stifling competition.  
This is not to suggest that encouraging or discouraging interfirm competition 
is the sole or even primary concern in designing RPE-based incentives. 
Benchmarking based on a broad market index performs a different economic 
function than benchmarking based on direct peer performance. The former 
 
92 To be sure, ISS and Glass Lewis gauge performance relative to a select peer group of 
companies, but it seems likely that companies would get some credit for RPE based on a broad 
market index. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81. 
93 See supra Section II.A. 
94 See supra text accompanying note 65. 
95 See supra Section II.A. 
96 Bizjak, Kalpathy, Li, and Young find that, for ISS Incentive Lab companies that use a 
select peer group, the average (median) number of companies in the group is 16.6 (15) and 
that the number of peers at the 25th and 75th percentiles are 11 and 20. See Bizjak et al., supra 
note 65, at 15. 
97 See id. 
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approach filters out broad market movements—such as the run up in the entire 
stock market during the early years of this decade—while the latter approach 
filters out market trends and industry trends. Each has its advantages, but the 
heavy use of select peer groups does not support the idea that pay design serves 
as a mechanism for discouraging competition. 
As discussed above, Schmalz argues that RPE-based compensation 
encourages product market competition when performance is measured based 
on company value creation, since such metrics encourage competition over 
market share and output, but that RPE discourages competition when based on 
margins, since margins are generally improved by restricting output.98 All else 
equal, common owners would prefer their portfolio companies to restrict output 
and push up prices. So it is feasible that companies might embrace RPE (and 
satisfy the proxy advisory firms and other stakeholders) while selecting RPE 
metrics that do not encourage fierce product market competition between 
commonly owned peer firms.  
Again, both types of RPE metrics are encountered in practice, but the most 
common metric employed, by far, is total shareholder return—and this metric 
falls squarely within the value creation/pro-competition camp. Bizjak, Kalpathy, 
Li, and Young find that 88% of ISS Incentive Lab companies issuing RPE 
awards in 2015 employed a total shareholder return metric.99 Again, heavy 
reliance on total shareholder return metrics does not seem to be consistent with 
discouraging competition through executive pay design. 
Another possibility is that companies in industries with high levels of 
common ownership shun RPE relative to companies in other industries or that 
these companies tend to employ weaker or competition-dampening RPE 
structures. This brings us to the empirical literature addressing the relationship 
between common ownership and RPE use, which is considered in the next 
section. 
E. A New Challenge to the Empirical Evidence on the Association Between 
Common Ownership and the Use of RPE 
The empirical evidence linking common ownership to reduced use of RPE is 
actually relatively modest. To date, four working papers investigate the link 
between common ownership and RPE, per se: the 2016 version of AEGS’s paper 
(later revised to focus on the sensitivity of executive wealth to performance 
rather than RPE)100 and papers by Rebecca DeSimone, Heung Jin Kwon, and 
Max Liang.101 AEGS and Liang find a negative relationship between common 
ownership and RPE, Kwon finds a positive relationship, and DeSimone finds no 
evidence that executive compensation design is a mechanism used by common 
 
98 See Schmalz, supra note 41. 
99 See Bizjak et al., supra note 65, at 15. 
100 See generally AEGS (2016), supra note 5; AEGS (2018), supra note 5. 
101 See generally DeSimone, supra note 6; Kwon, supra note 6; Liang, supra note 6. 
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owners to dampen competition.102 So one issue with the empirical evidence is 
that the results of the few studies we have are mixed. Other problems are 
methodological. 
Like the Azar et al. airline and banking papers, several of these papers use the 
MHHI to determine common-owner incentives.103 As noted above, this 
methodology has been criticized extensively, and I will not repeat those 
criticisms here.104 Instead, this Article highlights a separate and serious 
methodological concern with the other side of the equation: the measurement of 
executive incentives. In short, the primary empirical strategy employed in these 
papers is appropriate for identifying implicit RPE but not explicit RPE. If, as I 
argued above in Part II, explicit RPE dominates implicit RPE in modern 
executive pay arrangements, this is a fatal analytical flaw. 
Each of these papers uses ExecuComp’s total compensation variable 
(“TDC1”) as the primary measure of executive compensation.105 AEGS’s 
strategy is to determine the sensitivity of TDC1 to own-firm and to rival-firm 
performance.106 They predict (and find) that where common ownership is high, 
executives are paid relatively more for rival-firm performance and less for own-
firm performance.107 Liang’s strategy is similar.108 Kwon also uses TDC1 as his 
primary compensation variable but estimates pay-for-performance 
elasticities109—rather than sensitivities—and finds that greater common 
 
102 See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 54; DeSimone, supra note 6, at 2; Kwon, supra note 
6, at 34; Liang, supra note 6, at 25. 
103 See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 14; Kwon, supra note 6, at 2. DeSimone recognizes 
and discusses the limitations of the MHHI, but she employs it to demonstrate that the results 
of AEGS (2016) and Kwon are not robust. See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 4. Liang employs 
a 5% blockholder threshold in determining co-owned peers within three-digit SIC industries. 
Liang employs a 5% blockholder threshold in determining co-owned peers within three-digit 
SIC industries. See Liang, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 23-25; see also O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 23, 
at 596-97; Patel, supra note 24, at 300-18. From a theoretical point of view, Rock and 
Rubinfeld note that ISS makes no distinction between companies with high and low MHHI 
in its guidelines favoring RPE and argue that this makes it unlikely that there would be 
significant variation in the use of RPE based on the MHHI. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 
25, at 249-50. 
105 See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 15; DeSimone, supra note 6, at 10; Kwon, supra 
note 6, at 8-9, 42; Liang, supra note 6, at 9. 
106 See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 19-22, 57. 
107 See id. at 32. 
108 See Liang, supra note 6, at 1 (finding that CEO TDC1 is positively related to stock 
price performance of industry peers with common blockholders). 
109 See Kwon, supra note 6, at 8. Pay-for-performance elasticity refers to the percentage 
change in compensation relative to a percentage change in firm value; sensitivity refers to the 
dollar change in compensation relative to a dollar change in firm value. But see DeSimone, 
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ownership is associated with greater use of RPE.110 DeSimone replicates each 
of these approaches while making various methodological improvements and 
finds no significant relationship between common ownership and use of RPE.111 
ExecuComp variable TDC1 is a measure of aggregate compensation 
delivered to a senior executive in a given year.112 It includes salary; annual 
bonus; and long-term, non-equity compensation actually paid—but for the 
largest portions of executive pay, that is, long-term equity compensation, TDC1 
is an ex ante estimate.113 Conventional stock options are valued based on the 
Black-Scholes-Merton (“BSM”) option-pricing formula, with certain 
adjustments to reflect the idiosyncrasies of compensatory options.114 More 
complex performance awards are valued using BSM or, more commonly, Monte 
Carlo simulations.115 
The use of TDC1 as a compensation measure and the strategy of determining 
the sensitivity of TDC1 to own-firm and rival-firm performance are appropriate 
for identifying implicit use of RPE but are inappropriate for analyzing explicit 
RPE. Imagine first a compensation package consisting only of salary and a 
discretionary cash bonus. Compensation might be awarded based on firm-
specific performance only, or to some degree, upon relative performance. The 
latter would constitute implicit RPE, and measuring the sensitivity of total 
compensation awarded to own-firm performance and to rival-firm performance 
would be a reasonable way to gauge the extent of the implicit use of RPE in 
setting pay.  
But now consider pay packages that consist primarily of long-term, equity-
based pay. To simplify, let us suppose that compensation consists solely of a 
conventional stock option or, alternatively, of a performance share grant where 
the number of shares delivered is a function of three-year total shareholder return 
relative to that of a dozen peer companies. TDC1 in each case would equal the 
 
supra note 6, at 14 (criticizing Kwon’s use of elasticities from both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives). 
110 See Kwon, supra note 6, at 6. 
111 See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 12-17. 
112 Executive pay data collected in the ExecuComp database is based on proxy statement 
disclosures, which generally include pay data for a public company’s CEO, CFO, and three 
most highly compensated executives other than the CEO and CFO. The composition of this 
senior executive group has varied slightly over time. See Walker, supra note 48, at 245-46. 
113 See ExecuComp Data Definitions, WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., https://wrds-
www.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/960/Execucomp_Data_Definitions.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2019) (defining TDC1 as “[t]otal compensation comprised of the following: Salary, 
Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options 
Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total”). 
114 Most significantly, an experience-based estimated holding period is used to value 
compensatory options rather than the expiration period used in valuing tradable options. See 
Walker, supra note 43, at 423. 
115 See Bizjak et al., supra note 65, at 5 n.9. 
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ex ante value of the grant. Regressing TDC1 against own-firm and rival-firm 
performance would determine the implicit use of RPE in setting the size of these 
equity grants but tells us nothing about their explicit RPE characteristics. In this 
example, the explicit RPE characteristics would likely be much more important 
in terms of incentive creation than variations in the size of the awards. The 
relative total shareholder return award based on selected peer performance has 
strong explicit RPE features, while the conventional stock option lacks explicit 
RPE. 
It is completely possible, in fact, that companies that adopt long-term pay 
instruments incorporating strong, explicit RPE metrics might reduce the extent 
to which they adjust discretionary bonuses or salary awards for relative company 
performance. It is possible, in other words, that variations in implicit RPE 
determined in this fashion might run opposite to variations in total explicit and 
implicit RPE.116 At the least, there may be a tradeoff between identifying 
implicit and explicit RPE. If so, a strategy focusing on implicit RPE might be 
appropriate for analysis of data from the period in which explicit RPE was 
generally lacking in U.S. executive pay but inappropriate for analysis of data 
from the early 2000s on, when explicit RPE became central. 
DeSimone recognizes that TDC1 incorporates only the ex ante value of 
compensation and thus fails to fully reflect executive incentives.117 Nonetheless, 
she replicates (and improves upon) AEGS’s and Kwon’s approaches and finds 
no relationship between common ownership and the use of RPE.118 DeSimone 
goes on, however, to use ISS Incentive Lab data to test the relationship between 
common ownership (employing still admittedly flawed methodology) and the 
explicit use of RPE.119 She finds that the probability that a company utilizes an 
explicit RPE-based award and a measure of the size of such awards are either 
unrelated to or positively associated with the degree of common ownership 
within an industry.120  
In sum, the empirical evidence linking common ownership to reduced use of 
RPE is weak at best, is subject to serious methodological criticism, and does not 
support the claim that executive pay design is a mechanism for linking common 
ownership to reduced competition between companies. Given the secular trends 
 
116 AEGS and Kwon both note that they run alternative regressions using ExecuComp 
variable TDC2 as the measure of compensation and that their results are unchanged. AEGS 
(2016), supra note 5, at 31 n.5; Kwon, supra note 6, at 9 n.4. However, the only difference 
between TDC1 and TDC2 is that the latter replaces ex ante option values with realized values. 
TDC2 does not include the ex post value of performance shares, and the large majority of 
explicit RPE awards are performance share awards. See ExecuComp Data Definitions, supra 
note 113, at 48 (defining TDC2 as “[t]otal compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + 
Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Options Exercised”). 
117 See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 12, 17-18. 
118 See id. at 12. 
119 See id. at 15. 
120 See id. at 2, 21-23. 
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of increasing common ownership and increasing reliance on explicit RPE in 
executive pay contracts, as well as the particular design features of RPE-based 
awards, the lack of strong RPE-based evidence supporting the compensation 
mechanism is not surprising. 
III. COMMON OWNERSHIP AND THE SENSITIVITY 
OF EXECUTIVE WEALTH TO OWN-FIRM PERFORMANCE 
AEGS have revised their empirical strategy in the most recent version of their 
paper. Before, they investigated the association between common ownership and 
the sensitivity of executive pay to own-firm and rival-firm performance;121 now, 
they investigate the relationship between common ownership and the sensitivity 
of executive wealth to own-firm performance.122 The reason for this change is 
their recognition that annual “flow” compensation, even including long-term 
elements, represents only a fraction of executive incentives.123 They note that 
executives’ vested and unvested stock and option holdings are generally more 
significant than current pay in creating incentives, including incentives to 
compete hard with rival firms.124 Their revised hypothesis is that greater 
common ownership leads to less pressure to implement high-powered 
incentives, as measured by the sensitivity of executive wealth to own-firm 
performance.125 Unfortunately, as described below, there are serious conceptual 
and empirical difficulties with a wealth-sensitivity approach that cause it to be 
less promising than an RPE-based approach.  
A. The Revised AEGS Approach in Detail 
In the latest version of their working paper, AEGS employ various measures 
of the sensitivity of executive wealth to own-firm performance (“WPS”) as a 
dependent variable and various measures of common ownership and other 
controls as independent variables.126 In most specifications they find a 
statistically significant negative association between WPS and the degree of 
common ownership within an industry.127 They also conduct a difference-in-
differences analysis based on BlackRock’s 2009 acquisition of Barclays Global 
Investors (“BGI”), which consolidated the ownership of two very large and 
formerly distinct investment portfolios.128 Examining data for three years 
 
121 AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 5. 
122 AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 3. 
123 See id. at 3. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 2-3. 
126 See id. at 22-24. 
127 See id. at 22. 
128 See id. at 25. In 2008, BlackRock was the sixth largest and BGI the largest global asset 
manager. Table: The P&I/Watson Wyatt World 500, PENSIONS & INV. (Oct. 5, 2009, 1:00 
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following the acquisition compared to three years prior, they find that, relative 
to other industries, WPS declines when the common ownership within an 
industry increases as a result of this consolidation.129 As a possible mechanism 
for their findings, AEGS suggest: 
The simplest mechanism is that the absence of a large active blockholder 
(with a strong interest in the target firm and without interests in 
competitors) is associated with reduced efforts to design high-powered 
managerial incentives. In other words, common owners need not actively 
design flat incentives; they may merely fail to design steep ones the way a 
non-common owner would.130 
B. Concerns with the Revised AEGS Approach 
It is certainly true that an executive’s incentives depend on her equity 
portfolio as well as on current compensation instruments. And it is also true that 
evidence of a negative association between WPS and common ownership is 
consistent with evidence of a negative association between RPE and common 
ownership.131 But the shift from an RPE-based approach to a WPS-based 
approach in evaluating the relationship between common ownership and 
executive incentives is troubling for several reasons.132 
First, while it is also true that a low wealth-to-performance sensitivity would 
tend to discourage (or more precisely, not encourage) executives to compete 
hard with rival firms, a low WPS also discourages executives from working hard 
generally or from taking steps to increase profitability through noncompetitive 
channels, such as lobbying for more favorable industry-specific tax rules. The 
idea that common owners would want to provide low-powered incentives in 
order to discourage competition seems like tossing the baby out with the 
bathwater and is certainly inconsistent with the stated objectives of the largest 
institutional investors.133 Second, while companies clearly do manage executive 
incentives through the use and design of annual bonus schemes and equity-based 
pay, they largely lack the ability to fine-tune or adjust WPS in the short to 




129 See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 27. 
130 Id. at 4. AEGS do not directly test for the absence or presence of large, unconflicted 
blockholders. 
131 See id. at 3, 7. 
132 Hemphill and Kahan raise several methodological issues related to the revised AEGS 
paper. They note, for example, that AEGS ignore noninstitutional blockholders, which may 
lead to errors in the MHHI calculation. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 19). 
133 See infra Section III.B.1. 
134 See infra Section III.B.2. 
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are particularly difficult to square with the theory.135 Third, the shift to a WPS-
based approach presents methodological challenges that AEGS may not have 
addressed—specifically, the challenges in determining WPS associated with 
complex performance share awards incorporating multiple absolute and relative 
performance metrics.136 
1. Low WPS Is Inconsistent with Common-Owner Preferences 
First, while one can imagine that large common owners in concentrated 
industries, such as the airline industry or banking sector,137 might prefer 
collusion to competition and might prefer to avoid pay practices that encourage 
fierce competition, it seems much less plausible that preferences for collusion 
over competition would be so great that common owners would prefer weak 
incentives to powerful incentives generally. Of course, that is not exactly the 
claim. The claim is that common owners prefer and achieve marginally weaker 
executive incentives than noncommon blockholders, all else equal.138 Even so, 
it is unlikely that these preferences would be strong enough to translate into 
statistically significant results. Reducing pay-for-performance incentives simply 
seems too blunt an instrument for minimizing interfirm competition. At the same 
time that investors would be reducing incentives for interfirm competition, they 
would be reducing incentives for executives to work hard generally, including 
in ways that would not shift profits away from competitors but would increase 
overall industry profitability, such as through lobbying for tax or other 
regulatory concessions. As Hemphill and Kahan suggest, “A wholesale dilution 
of [executive] incentives makes sense, if at all, only for firms where the bulk of 
managerial effort otherwise would be devoted to competition at the expense of 
other [commonly owned] portfolio firms.”139 
This is the key difference between WPS and RPE, and the key reason that 
WPS is a less plausible lever for managing executive incentives than RPE. 
Strong WPS incentives with low RPE would encourage a focus on overall 
profitability but not fierce competition with rival firms, whereas strong WPS- 
and RPE-based incentives would encourage that competition.140 Common 
 
135 See infra Section III.B.2. 
136 See infra Section III.B.3. 
137 See generally Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3; Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 
3. 
138 AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 1-4. 
139 Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 21). 
140 This statement is true assuming that a competition-inducing RPE metric, such as total 
shareholder return, is utilized. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99. Of course, WPS and 
RPE are likely to be correlated to some extent, and WPS might be viewed as a proxy for RPE, 
but the point remains that RPE should be a more promising place to look for incentive 
management than WPS. 
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owners should strongly prefer the former over the latter and the former over 
weak WPS incentives generally. 
Moreover, the largest institutional investors—both the index fund families but 
also other large institutional investors—claim that they care about and work to 
achieve executive pay arrangements that encourage strong performance. The 
proxy-voting guidelines of these investors uniformly stress the importance of 
compensation programs that align the interests of executives with those of 
shareholders and create an effective link between executive pay and 
performance.141 Some investors state that they will not support pay arrangements 
that insufficiently link pay with performance.142  
Of course, one might object that the stated preferences of institutional 
investors for strong incentives should be discounted as cheap talk. How likely is 
it that institutional investors would publicly announce that they do not care about 
executive pay or actually prefer weak incentives at commonly owned 
companies, even if it were true? Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence 
revealing how common owners vote on or otherwise influence executive pay, 
but we do know that institutional investors are not totally passive on the 
executive-pay front. Since 2011, U.S. public companies have been required to 
hold a nonbinding shareholder vote on the acceptability of senior executive pay 
at least once every three years.143 While a large majority of shareholders approve 
most of these “say on pay” proposals,144 institutional investors not infrequently 
 
141 See BLACKROCK, supra note 76, at 11 (“BlackRock supports equity plans that align the 
economic interests of directors, managers, and other employees with those of shareholders.”); 
CAPITAL GROUP, supra note 76 (“Compensation should create incentives for superior 
investment returns and align management’s long-term interests with those of the 
shareholders.”); FIDELITY, supra note 76, at 6 (“Fidelity generally will support proposals to 
ratify executive compensation unless the compensation appears misaligned with shareholder 
interests . . . .”); VANGUARD, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 12 
(2019) (noting that “[a]lignment of pay and performance” is one category of considerations 
in executive compensation decisions and that “[i]n general, a fund . . . will support [executive 
compensation proposals] that enhance long-term shareholder value”); 2019 Proxy Voting and 
Engagement Guidelines: North America (United States & Canada), ST. STREET GLOBAL 
ADVISORS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/viewpoints/2019-proxy-
voting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html (“[SSGA] believes executive 
compensation plays a critical role in aligning executives interest with shareholder’s . . . [and] 
support[s] management proposals on executive compensation where there is a strong 
relationship between executive pay and performance over a five-year period.”). 
142 See, e.g., BLACKROCK, supra note 76, at 11 (stating intention to oppose executive pay 
plans that exhibit a “pay-for performance disconnect”); VANGUARD, supra note 141, at 12-13 
(noting objectionable features of executive pay plans). 
143 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1). 
144 While between 1% and 3% of say-on-pay votes fail each year, that is, achieve less than 
50% shareholder approval, in aggregate over 90% of individual say-on-pay votes have been 
“yes” votes. SEMLER BROSSY, 2018 SAY ON PAY AND PROXY RESULTS 6 (2018), 
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vote “no.” A recent study found that the median of the largest twenty-five 
institutional investors voted “no” on say-on-pay proposals 8.2% of the time in 
2016.145 The study also found a close correlation between the votes of many of 
these investors and the recommendations of ISS and/or Glass Lewis, suggesting 
that the emphasis of the proxy advisory firms on pay for performance translates 
into say-on-pay voting by at least some large institutional investors that are 
likely to be common owners.146 In addition, Jill Fisch, Darius Palia, and Steven 
Solomon examined say-on-pay voting at S&P 1500 companies between 2011 
and 2016 and found some evidence that the sensitivity of pay to company 
performance has a statistically significant impact on voting outcomes.147 Of 
course, none of this evidence establishes that institutional investors impose 
discipline on pay practices with equal vigor at companies in industries with 
heavy common ownership. However, the point holds that the adoption of weak 
incentives generally would seem to run counter to interest, particularly as 
contrasted with the adoption of strong WPS incentives with little or no RPE. 
2. Executive WPS Is Difficult to Adjust over the Short to Medium Term 
Perhaps because it is difficult to envision common owners actively advocating 
for weak incentives, AEGS suggest that their results may be explained by 
common owners remaining passive while blockholders in industries that lack 
heavy common ownership aggressively pursue high-powered incentives.148 
They do not directly test for the presence or absence of large, unconflicted 
blockholders, but this proposed mechanism is consistent with both their primary 
findings and the findings of an analysis of a natural experiment.149 In 2009, 
BlackRock acquired BGI, combining the investment portfolios of the sixth 
largest (BlackRock) and the largest (BGI) asset managers at the time and 
increasing the amount of common ownership within a number of industries.150 
AEGS’s difference-in-differences analysis compares executive WPS in 
industries that experienced a large increase in common ownership as a result of 
 
https://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2018-SOP-Report-06-06-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4VS-VK8E] (detailing say-on-pay voting results at Russell 3000 
companies from 2011 through 2018). 
145 MICHAEL KEEBAUGH, KELLY MALAFIS & ROBERT MARTIN, CAPFLASH: INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER VOTING PRACTICES FOR SAY ON PAY 1 (2016), https://www.capartners.com 
/wp-content/uploads/news/id317/capartners.com-capflash-issue92.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/QC2S-GEV3]. The institutional shareholder at the twenty-fifth percentile voted no 4.3% of 
the time and the shareholder at the seventy-fifth percentile voted no 11.7% of the time. Id. 
146 Id. 
147 See Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? 
The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 103 (2018). 
148 See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 4. 
149 See id. at 27. 
150 Table: The P&I/Watson Wyatt World 500, supra note 128. 
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the BlackRock/BGI merger with WPS in industries in which common ownership 
was less affected by the merger. They find that, in industries more greatly 
affected by the merger, WPS was relatively lower in the three years following 
the merger, suggesting that common ownership levels affect pay design.151 
There are two possible, non-mutually exclusive explanations for the 
BlackRock/BGI results: First, companies in industries that experienced large 
increases in common ownership might have reduced executive WPS while WPS 
in other industries remained unchanged. Second, these companies might have 
maintained current levels of WPS while companies in other industries increased 
WPS. The latter explanation is consistent with AEGS’s suggested mechanism, 
but neither explanation seems likely, particularly given the three-year period of 
analysis pre- and post-merger. 
It will be helpful to consider how companies actually create and manage 
wealth-based executive incentives. It will be readily apparent that while 
companies undoubtedly manage these incentives over the long term, they make 
little effort and have little scope to do so over the short to medium term.  
WPS is primarily a function of shares and options held by an executive, 
including equity held contingently upon satisfaction of vesting conditions and 
shares and options held outright. Thus, we can think of WPS arising from three 
sources—current year compensation, outstanding equity awards from previous 
years, and ownership of vested shares and options. The extent to which 
companies can and do adjust WPS differs among these sources. 
a. Adjusting WPS Through Current Compensation 
Companies could most readily adjust WPS by adjusting the terms of current 
compensation. They could do so without affecting total pay by shifting 
compensation between channels that are not sensitive to company performance 
(i.e., salary) and channels that are sensitive (i.e., annual bonuses and equity-
based pay). However, companies traditionally have not varied salary 
significantly from year to year. We observe significant variation from year to 
year in the type and amount of equity-based pay issued to executives (and thus 
total pay), but we do not commonly observe tradeoffs between salary and equity-
based pay. Companies could also adjust WPS by shortening or lengthening the 
vesting periods—essentially the holding periods—for various equity awards, but 
these vesting periods tend to be both uniform and sticky. 
Let us begin by considering why companies do not tend to tweak the 
allocation of pay between salary and performance-sensitive pay channels. One 
reason is tax. In 1992, Congress limited the deduction for senior executive pay 
to $1 million per executive per year, but created an exception for performance-
based pay that was sufficiently broad so as to include properly designed annual 
 
151 AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 27. 
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bonuses and certain equity-based pay.152 But salary in excess of $1 million per 
year was clearly not deductible, and for years many companies limited salaries 
to $1 million to avoid delivering nondeductible compensation dollars.153 On the 
other hand, companies that paid senior executives salaries less than $1 million 
per year prior to 1993 tended to raise salaries to reflect the new “cap.”154 So the 
tax rule tended to create both a ceiling and a floor for senior executive salaries 
and to inhibit variability.  
Another reason that we may not observe tradeoffs between salary and equity-
based pay is that these channels of compensation are thought to serve very 
different purposes. Salary is generally viewed as providing basic financial 
security, while equity-based pay is intended to incentivize risk taking, reward 
success, and enhance retention.155 Whatever the reason, the empirical evidence 
suggests that equity compensation grants are not fully offset by reductions in 
base pay.156 So while companies could adjust the sensitivity of current 
compensation to company performance year by year by shifting compensation 
dollars between salary and equity-based pay, there is no evidence that they do 
so. Of course, companies can and do adjust WPS when they increase or decrease 
equity pay grants, but obviously this affects an executive’s total compensation 
as well as WPS. 
Companies also could adjust the WPS associated with current compensation 
by changing the terms—most directly the vesting terms—of equity-based pay. 
 
152 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 
Stat. 312, 469-70 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m)). Section 162(m) was amended by 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13211(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 
2155-56 (codified at I.R.C. § 162(m)), to deny deductibility for all senior executive pay in 
excess of $1 million per year, regardless of any performance linkage. 
153 See, e.g., Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation 
and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 456 (2001) (finding 
reductions in salary and reduced salary growth at companies affected by § 162(m)). 
154 See, e.g., David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit 
Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT. 
REV. 997, 1015 (2002) (finding that companies unaffected by § 162(m) limited increases in 
CEO cash compensation in proportion to the extent that pay was expected to be below the $1 
million benchmark). 
155 See, e.g., Yale D. Tauber, A Perspective on Executive Compensation, in EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 1, 4 tbl.1-1 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002). 
156 Matthias Benz, Marcel Kucher & Alois Stutzer, Are Stock Options the Managers’ 
Blessing? Stock Option Compensation and Institutional Controls 22 (Zurich Inst. for 
Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 61, 2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=251009 [https://perma.cc/3DNC-5Q3M]; Marianne Bertrand & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principles Do 6 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7604, 2000), https://www.nber.org 
/papers/w7604.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRG7-Y6AZ]. 
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Most public companies make equity grants to executives on an annual basis.157 
Given that executives often dispose of equity-based pay upon vesting,158 equity-
based pay that vests in five years creates greater WPS than equity-based pay that 
vests in three years.159 But again, we rarely observe year-to-year variation in the 
vesting terms attached to equity-based pay. When options reigned supreme, 
these instruments generally vested over a three- to five-year period and were 
generally exercisable at the recipient’s discretion for up to a decade after 
issuance.160 Today, performance share schemes dominate,161 but again the 
vesting periods are relatively uniform and quite sticky. Most plans deliver shares 
or the cash-equivalent after a three-year performance period.162 And again, we 
rarely observe year-to-year variation in the length of the performance period. It 
does not appear that companies tweak the vesting terms of equity-based pay to 
adjust WPS. 
Contrast the difficulty of adjusting WPS over the short term with the ease of 
adjusting RPE. Given the complexity and heterogeneity of RPE-based 
compensation, it would be unremarkable for a company to grant a performance 
award in one year that incorporates strong RPE-based metrics and benchmarks, 
and in a second year to select weaker RPE metrics and benchmarks or to replace 
RPE metrics with absolute, i.e., firm-specific, metrics. This can be done without 
making any tradeoff with salary or other pay that is not based on performance. 
To be sure, most performance awards measure results over a three-year period, 
but in the span of three years, a company could shift from strong RPE to no RPE 
or vice versa, changes that would have little or no impact on WPS.163 
 
157 In 2016, for example, 86% of the public-company senior executives whose 
compensation is reported in the Compustat ExecuComp database received some form of 
equity compensation grant (author’s calculation). 
158 See Alex Edmans, Vivian W. Fang & Katharina A. Lewellen, Equity Vesting and 
Investment, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2229, 2230 (2017) (noting that executive equity sales are 
highly correlated with vesting). 
159 Suppose, for example, that ACME issues its CEO 1000 shares of stock each year that 
vest in three years and that the CEO immediately sells the vested shares. In steady state, the 
CEO will hold 3000 unvested shares at any time. If the vesting period is increased to five 
years, she will hold 5000 unvested shares at any time. 
160 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 
2485, 2507-10 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Cards eds., 1999). These option-vesting practices 
remain prevalent today. See FW COOK, supra note 61, at 13 (stating that 97% of 250 largest 
S&P 500 companies surveyed in 2018 reported that their option grants vested in three to five 
years). 
161 See supra Section II.B. 
162 See FW COOK, supra note 61, at 17 (noting that 91% of surveyed companies reported 
measurement period of three years). 
163 Compare, for example, two performance awards that are each expected to result in a 
CEO receiving 10,000 shares of stock after three years. One is based exclusively on firm-
specific performance—no RPE—while the other includes only a single strong RPE-based 
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b. Adjusting WPS Through Previously Issued Compensation 
Short of dismissing executives prior to vesting, companies have essentially 
no ability to adjust WPS associated with equity-based pay issued in prior years. 
Once equity-based pay is issued, the vesting or holding periods, which largely 
determine the WPS-based incentives, are either fixed (restricted stock and 
performance shares) or are actually under the control of the executives 
(options).164 Post-issuance, companies do not retain discretion over vesting or 
exercise that might allow them to tweak WPS after the fact. To be sure, the 
number of shares underlying performance share grants is generally variable, but 
the targets are set at issuance and are not within a company’s control.165 
c. Adjusting WPS Associated with Vested Stock 
Moreover, companies do very little to control executive ownership of vested 
shares, and to my knowledge they never cap executive ownership. To be sure, 
many companies have share-ownership guidelines for senior executives, but 
conventional wisdom suggests that these guidelines are rarely binding, either 
because they are modest compared to executive compensation levels, are 
satisfied by unvested equity pay, or are simply viewed as guidelines and not 
enforced as strict requirements.166 
***** 
In sum, companies could manage WPS associated with current compensation 
by making adjustments to compensation mix or the vesting terms of long-term 
instruments, but they do not appear to make frequent changes in either. 
Companies have little scope to manage WPS associated with issued and 
unvested or vested equity. This is not to suggest that companies do not manage 
executive WPS. Of course they do, but only in the way that one adjusts the 
course of an oil tanker—very slowly.  
As a result, it is difficult to fathom the idea that companies in industries with 
large holdings by BlackRock and/or BGI either consciously reduced executive 
WPS within three years of the acquisition in light of greater post-acquisition 
 
metric. Since the executive is expected to receive 10,000 shares with either award, the WPS 
created by the two awards is the same, while the RPE characteristics are obviously quite 
different. 
164 See supra notes 49 and 51. 
165 Performance share plans with variable payouts linked to multiple performance targets 
result in an economic relationship between share price and payout that is very similar to that 
of an option. See Walker, supra note 43, at 413. AEGS’s description of their methods is not 
sufficient to allow me to determine whether they take this “optionality” into account in 
measuring WPS. 
166 See Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and Reality, 90 IND. L.J. 
353, 357 (2015) (discussing these limitations and finding that such policies are “extremely 
ineffectual”). 
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common ownership or failed to respond as companies in other industries took 
steps to increase WPS.167 Setting aside the question of whether BlackRock, one 
of the largest index-focused investors, would have an incentive to manage WPS 
and interfirm competition,168 the companies in industries that became more 
commonly owned after the BlackRock/BGI merger would have had no levers 
with which to reduce WPS associated with outstanding equity awards and the 
only means of reducing WPS associated with vested share holdings would have 
been to soften shareholding guidelines allowing executives to sell more shares, 
which, given the optics, seems unlikely.169 As a result, any reduction in WPS 
would have to have been achieved through adjustments to current compensation 
grants and, given the relatively short period of study, through reducing the size 
of equity grants rather than through shortening vesting periods.  
Alternatively, companies in industries that became more commonly owned 
might have maintained WPS while companies in other industries increased 
WPS. But why would the BlackRock/BGI merger prompt an increase in WPS 
in industries unaffected or less affected by the merger? Of course, the timing 
might have been coincidental, but again, even if the companies in these other 
industries purposefully set out to increase WPS, the tools with which they could 
do so in a three-year period would be quite limited. 
AEGS suggest that the absence of a large active blockholder without an 
interest in competing companies is the simplest mechanism explaining their 
findings.170 But in order to explain the results of the BlackRock/BGI difference 
in differences analysis, one would have to assume either the entry of new 
unconflicted blockholders into the industries that were less affected by the 
merger, or that existing unconflicted blockholders in these industries for some 
reason became more aggressive in managing WPS after the BlackRock/BGI 
merger. Otherwise, one must assume that companies in industries that became 
more heavily commonly owned actually reduced WPS. Neither explanation 
seems likely.  
 
167 Cf. AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 25-28 (finding evidence consistent with either or 
both phenomena). 
168 See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 40); supra note 33 and 
accompanying text. 
169 Such a move might also have been irrelevant as executive share ownership guidelines 
generally are not binding. See Shilon, supra note 166, at 357. 
170 See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 4 (“The simplest mechanism is that the absence of 
a large active blockholder (with a strong interest in the target firm and without interests in 
competitors) is associated with reduced efforts to design high-powered managerial incentives. 
In other words, common owners need not actively design flat incentives; they may merely fail 
to design steep ones the way a non-common owner would.”). 
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3. Methodological Concerns with a WPS-Based Assessment of Incentives 
In their revised draft paper, AEGS rely upon the sensitivity of executive 
wealth to own-firm performance to determine the strength of incentives in both 
their panel regressions and their difference-in-differences analysis of 
BlackRock’s acquisition of BGI. Doing so, of course, requires calculation of 
WPS associated with shares owned outright as well as outstanding equity pay 
grants. Calculating WPS for complex, performance-based equity pay awards is 
exceptionally challenging, however, and it is unclear how AEGS have dealt with 
this task. It is difficult to have confidence in their empirical results without 
having confidence in this fundamental element of the analysis.171 
AEGS say very little in their paper with respect to calculation of WPS. They 
note that they follow the approach utilized by Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, and 
Augustin Landier in a 2008 article.172 Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier provide a 
detailed description of how they determined WPS, which is based on earlier 
work by Core and Guay.173 The basic idea is this: wealth associated with a share 
of stock held outright or with time-vested restricted stock, assuming that the 
shares ultimately vest, increases or decreases dollar for dollar with the 
company’s share price, but the value of an option and wealth associated with an 
 
171 A second, perhaps less significant, concern with AEGS’s revised WPS-based approach 
is limited to their difference-in-differences analysis. There appears to be an at least equally 
plausible explanation for AEGS’s finding of a relative reduction in WPS in more heavily 
commonly owned industries following BlackRock’s acquisition of BGI that does not 
necessarily support their hypothesis. Suppose that, relative to BGI, BlackRock more 
aggressively pursued reductions in or limitations on executive pay. In fact, the most plausible 
mechanism for a post-merger reduction in WPS would be reduction in current year equity 
pay. Given the stickiness of salary and annual bonuses, it is likely that reductions in equity 
pay would not have been made up elsewhere. If BlackRock pushed harder on equity pay at 
companies in which it had a larger ownership position post-merger, reductions in current 
equity pay would translate into reduced WPS in each of AEGS’s three WPS specifications, 
assuming that other elements of pay were unaffected. To be sure, one might also be surprised 
to learn that BlackRock aggressively monitors executive pay, see, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, 
supra note 14 (manuscript at 47-48) (providing evidence that index fund managers tend to be 
deferential to management), but this idea seems at least as plausible as the idea that they 
monitor WPS in order to discourage interfirm competition. And, of course, if the post-
BlackRock/BGI merger evidence is about pay levels and not incentives, this evidence would 
not necessarily support the thesis that executive incentives are a mechanism linking common 
ownership with reduced competition. 
172 AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 22 (citing Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix & Augustin 
Landier, A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 4881, 4881-917 (1990)). 
173 See Edmans, Gabaix & Landier, supra note 172, at 4898 app. B (citing John Core & 
Wayne Guay, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their 
Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 613, 613-630 (2002)). 
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option is related to share price in a more complex, nonlinear fashion.174 
Economists use the term “delta” to describe the change in the value of a 
compensation instrument arising from a small change in the underlying share 
price. Restricted stock and stock held outright have a delta of one; options have 
a delta of less than one that depends on the current market price and volatility of 
the shares, the option exercise price, remaining time to expiration, etc. Although 
complex, option delta—like option value—can be easily estimated using the 
BSM methodology.175 The sum of the delta-weighted shares and options held by 
an executive is the key input into determining WPS.176  
But what about performance shares? Performance shares were rare when Core 
and Guay published their work in 2002 and had only recently become important 
at the end of the period studied by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier.177 Neither of 
these articles discusses performance shares. Both articles focus exclusively on 
stock (deemed to be time-vested only by implication) and conventional 
compensatory options.178 But unlike time-vested restricted stock, performance 
shares do not have delta equal to one.179 And, of course, performance shares now 
dominate the equity pay landscape. 
Like determining value, determining the incentive characteristics of 
performance share grants is exceptionally complex. The complexity arises from 
the variable award schedule that is a function of absolute or relative performance 
(or both) with respect to market, accounting, or other measures.180 Moreover, 
while companies are required to disclose an ex ante value for these awards, they 
are not required to disclose their incentive characteristics.  
The difficulty of determining incentive characteristics is multiplied when 
awards are based on multiple metrics, which is increasingly the case. 
Recognizing these challenges, Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy elect to 
analyze the value and incentive characteristics of a limited subset of 
performance awards that include only a single, absolute performance metric.181 
Even for this restricted sample of grants, they find it necessary to develop new 
simulation methods to study these awards. Having done so, they find that the 
addition of performance-vesting conditions amplifies incentives to increase 
shareholder value (i.e., increases compensation delta) versus purely time-vested 
restricted stock.182 Although they limit their analysis to single, absolute metric 
 
174 See Walker, supra note 48, at 237. 
175 Id. at 237-38. 
176 Edmans, Gabaix & Landier, supra note 172, at 4898. 
177 Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier analyzed data for the 1992-2006 period. Id. at 4899. 
178 Core and Guay’s 2002 article only addresses the determination of value and incentive 
properties of options. See Core & Guay, supra note 173, at 613. 
179 Bettis et al., supra note 60, at 197. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 200, 211. 
182 Id. at 212. 
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awards, there is no reason to think that the outcome would be directionally 
different for more complex award types. 
The upshot is that the WPS associated with performance shares is likely to be 
significantly different, and likely greater, than that associated with time-vested 
restricted stock, but the impact is a function of the metrics and benchmarks 
employed. In cases in which companies employ a combination of absolute and 
relative performance metrics, it will be exceptionally challenging to determine 
the delta and WPS associated with these grants.  
If AEGS apply delta of one to all stock grants, whether time-vested alone or 
performance-vested, it is likely that they will have misestimated WPS associated 
with performance shares. Such misestimation is likely to be particularly 
significant for recent periods, including the years surrounding the 
BlackRock/BGI merger, in which performance share awards have been 
prevalent.  
IV. TOWARD AN IMPROVED EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
For the reasons discussed above, it seems unlikely that a negative causal 
relationship exists between institutional investor common ownership within an 
industry and the strength of executive incentives. Unfortunately, the empirical 
strategies used to date have not been sufficient to establish the presence of such 
an association or the lack thereof. This is an important gap since executive 
incentives are generally viewed as one of the more plausible mechanisms 
underpinning the broader claim of a link between common ownership and 
reduced competition. In the spirit of advancing the empirical analyses and 
resolving this important question, this Part offers some suggestions with respect 
to the executive-incentive side of the equation. 
First, tests for a link between common ownership and executive incentives 
based on RPE seem more promising than tests based on WPS from both a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective. From a theoretical perspective, it makes 
more sense that common owners would favor strong performance-based 
incentives that lack RPE than weak incentives generally.183 Generally, weak 
incentives are simply too blunt an instrument for deterring competition. Also, it 
is easier to adjust RPE than WPS over the short or medium term. Given all of 
this, one would think that an empirical strategy focusing on RPE would be more 
likely to produce an association between common ownership levels and 
executive incentives, if an association is to be found.  
But both approaches present empirical challenges. For RPE-based 
approaches, there is the problem that RPE can be implicit, explicit, or both. An 
improved empirical methodology must account for both implicit and explicit 
RPE. As discussed above, determining the sensitivity of total compensation to 
own-firm and rival-firm performance is an appropriate means of gauging 
 
183 See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 21-22) (reaching same 
conclusion). 
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implicit RPE, but explicit RPE likely dominates in recent years, and it is difficult 
to quantify the economic magnitude of explicit RPE features of equity awards.184 
DeSimone tests for a relationship between common ownership and firm use of 
explicit RPE, defined as any RPE-based award granted in a firm-year, and the 
relative size of RPE grants, measured as the grant-date value of awards that 
include RPE metrics as a fraction of the grant-date value of all long-term 
incentive awards.185 This is a good start, but even the latter measure is only a 
rough proxy for the incentive effects of RPE awards (and, of course, only 
accounts for explicit RPE). The RPE feature or features of a particular award 
can be central or they can be trivial. In addition to the relative size of awards, an 
improved approach could take into account available data (from ISS Incentive 
Lab) on the following features: 
 
(1) the number of RPE and non-RPE metrics in a particular award. An award 
with RPE metrics exclusively is likely to provide stronger RPE than an award 
that includes one or more absolute (non-RPE) metrics. 
(2) the nature of the RPE metric. As Schmalz notes, metrics based on 
company value, such as total shareholder return, create incentives to compete 
for market share, while metrics that are based on margins likely discourage such 
competition.186 
(3) the benchmark. Benchmarking RPE against a select group of peer firms 
provides the strongest incentive to compete. The use of an industry index 
provides a weaker incentive to compete. The use of a broad market index likely 
produces no additional incentive to compete with peer firms (relative to an award 
lacking RPE). 
 
While an RPE-based empirical strategy seems clearly preferable to a WPS-
based strategy, researchers should not completely ignore WPS. Imagine two 
executives with similar RPE-based incentives, but one has much larger share 
and option holdings, leading to much larger WPS. All else equal, the executive 
with large WPS will have a greater incentive to compete with rival firms (or do 
other things to increase share value). As such, WPS should at least serve as a 
control variable in the analysis. As noted above, determining WPS for 
performance awards is not trivial. Some rule of thumb may have to be developed 
to estimate WPS for these awards. Hopefully, however, this problem will be less 
acute if WPS serves as a control rather than as the dependent variable. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the seemingly inexorable rise in institutional investor ownership of 
U.S. equity securities and common ownership, the influence of common owners 
on competition is quickly becoming one of the most important topics in 
 
184 See supra Part II. 
185 DeSimone, supra note 6, at 20-23. 
186 See Schmalz, supra note 41, at slide 63. 
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corporate governance and regulation. The seriousness of the problem and the 
advisability of intervention is a matter of heated debate. A key question in this 
debate involves the mechanism that could translate anticompetitive incentives 
of common owners into anticompetitive behavior by corporate managers. 
Without a plausible mechanism, the arguments of proponents of regulatory 
intervention lose much of their force. 
Executive pay design has been a leading candidate for that mechanism. As 
this Article has detailed, however, the evidence linking executive incentives with 
common ownership is actually quite weak. The macro-level trends in the use of 
explicit RPE and common ownership and the most commonly employed RPE 
design features run exactly counter to the mechanism hypothesis. And now, 
particularly given that AEGS have moved away from an RPE-based approach, 
the weight of the remaining empirical evidence does not support the suggestion 
that avoidance of RPE is a mechanism linking common ownership with 
diminished interfirm competition.  
The dramatic increase in the explicit use of RPE-based compensation metrics 
over the last twenty years undermines not only the compensation mechanism, 
but also the passive or “do nothing” mechanism proposed by Azar, Schmalz, and 
Tecu.187 The idea here is that, unlike sole owners, common owners might simply 
do nothing to promote competition and allow managers to live the quiet life. 
Adopting RPE-based compensation, however, is exactly the opposite of doing 
nothing. 
The related but slightly different idea that greater common ownership leads 
to reduced sensitivity of executive wealth to own-firm performance—that is, to 
lower-powered incentives generally—and thus to dampening interfirm 
competition seems implausibly overbroad. Moreover, this Article has offered 
several conceptual and methodological reasons to question the evidence offered 
by the sole paper adopting this approach to date.188 
In sum, this Article has provided numerous reasons to conclude that executive 
pay design is an implausible mechanism linking common ownership with 
dampened competition. If accepted, these arguments tend to undermine the more 
general claim and add further cautionary notes to the debate regarding regulatory 
intervention. 
However, this Article certainly does not purport to disprove the compensation 
hypothesis; instead, it claims that the existing evidence is weaker than is 
generally understood. As such, and despite skepticism regarding the hypothesis, 
this Article has also offered several suggestions for improving the compensation 
side of empirical analyses investigating the potential link between common 
ownership and executive incentives. My hope is that these suggestions will help 
analysts advance our understanding of this important issue. 
 
187 See supra text accompanying note 32. 
188 See generally AEGS (2018), supra note 5. 
